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ESSAY
WHEN LAWYERS BECOME LEGISLATORS:
AN ESSAY AND A PROPOSAL
THOMAS MORE KELLENBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is shameful when a legislator acts unethically.1 It is even more
shameful when the unethical legislator is an attorney sworn to uphold a
code of professional responsibility.2 While the legal profession has no au-
thority to regulate the ethical conduct of the nonattorney legislator,3 the
profession has the authority and the obligation to regulate the ethical con-
* B.A. 1980, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1986, Harvard Law School. Law Clerk to the
Honorable John C. Coughenour, United States District Court for the Western District of Wash-
ington, 1989-91. Law Clerk to the Honorable Robert R. Beezer, United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, 1991-92.
1. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 703 (1984) ("Shame... is acknowledgment that there is
something objectionable in the conduct that goes beyond the impolite and the merely illegal.
Shame does not conclusively establish but it points to the moral nature of the matter.").
2. The American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by
the ABA House of Delegates in 1969 and thereafter by most states. See "' . . In the Spirit of Public
Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 258 (1986)
[hereinafter ABA Blueprint for Professionalism] (collecting papers from 1986 Conference on Ac-
cess to Justice). The Code consists of three types of provisions: Nine Canons state general ethical
postulates; the Disciplinary Rules are legally binding norms, the violation of which may result in
disciplinary adjudication; and the Ethical Considerations are admonitory and provide justifica-
tions for the Disciplinary Rules. Id. While the ABA revised the Code in 1983, creating the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, most states continue to rely substantially on Code formula-
tions. See Lawyers Man. on Prof Conduct (ABA/BNA) 01: 1-01:40 (1987).
3. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble and Preliminary Statement
(1986) ("Obviously the Canons, Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules cannot apply to
non-lawyers; however, they do define the type of ethical conduct that the public has a right to
expect not only of lawyers but also of their non-professional employees and associates in all mat-
ters pertaining to professional employment."); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
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duct of the attorney-legislator.4 Specific ethical standards govern the con-
duct of judges,5 prosecutors,6 defense counsel,7 clerks of court,8 and even
law clerks.9 Even though the attorney-legislator faces ethical demands at
least as compelling as those faced by judicial officers, the conduct of the
attorney-legislator is governed only by general, often irrelevant and incom-
plete, norms of ethical conduct applicable to attorneys in private practice. 1o
This Article addresses the lack of professional ethical standards gov-
erning the conduct of the attorney-legislator. 1 Section II of this Article
discusses the rationale for a code of ethics for the attorney-legislator. Sec-
tion III of this Article proposes a model code of ethics to govern the con-
duct of the attorney-legislator and, it is hoped, to replace the idea of
SIBILITY EC 3-3 (1986) ("A non-lawyer who undertakes to handle legal matters is not governed as
to integrity or legal competence by the same rules that govern the conduct of a lawyer.").
4. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) ("[T]he States have a compelling
interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries .... The interest of the States in
regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental func-
tion of administering justice.").
5. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, reprinted in 2 ADMINISTRA-
TIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCE-
DURES 1-1 (1990); see also CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972).
6. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (1979).
7. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDERS, reprinted in 2 ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCE-
DURES 11-45 (1990); see also ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (1979).
8. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES CLERKS (AND DEPUTY CLERKS), re-
printed in 2 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 11-3 (1990).
9. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS, reprinted in 2 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 11-55
(1990).
10. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 336 (1974) ("It
would be utterly incongruous with the entire tenor of the code to find that its provisions regarding
lawyers who engage in fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or illegal conduct involving moral turpi-
tude do not apply to them when they are acting as... public servants."). Because the conduct of
the attorney-legislator is governed by the code of professional responsibility, the attorney-legisla-
tor is generally held to a higher ethical standard than the nonattorney legislator. However,
although the legal profession holds the attorney-legislator to a higher ethical standard than the
nonattorney legislator, the legal profession has not given specific guidance to the attorney-legisla-
tor, in the form of a model code of ethics, as to what constitutes unethical legislative conduct.
11. With a renewed public scrutiny of unethical conduct by lawmakers, such a code is proba-
bly inevitable. See Mary J. Frug, Introduction: The Proposed Revisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility: Solving the Crisis of Professionalism, or Legitimating the Status Quo?, 26 VILL. L.
REV. 1121, 1122 (1980-81) ("[T]he profession can trace the development of each of its formal
codes to a crisis of the social order and the complicity of lawyers in that crisis.").
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legislative office as an opportunity for spoils 2 with the idea of legislative
office as public service."3
II. ETHICS AND THE ATTORNEY-LEGISLATOR
A. The Narrative of Legal Ethics
The legal profession shares a narrative about what lawyers are and what
lawyers should be.14 According to the narrative, the legal profession is dis-
tinguished by the requirements of formal training and admission to practice
by licensure, a code of ethics imposing standards qualitatively beyond those
that are tolerated in the marketplace, a duty to subordinate financial reward
to social responsibility, and, notably, "an obligation on its members, even in
nonprofessional matters, to conduct themselves as members of a learned,
disciplined, and honorable occupation."' 5 The narrative speaks of lawyers
"pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public ser-
vice." 16 According to the narrative, lawyers "play a vital role in the preser-
vation of society,"' 7 and laypersons "should expect no less than the highest
degree of professionalism when they have entrusted administration of the
rule of law-one of the fundamental tenets upon which our society is
based-to the legal profession.""8  A lawyer, the narrative concludes, will
find his or her highest honor in a "deserved reputation for fidelity to private
trust and to public duty."' 9
12. "[A]lithough men have many motives for entering political life.., the vast underpinning
of both major parties is made up of men who seek practical rewards. Tangible advantages consti-
tute the unifying thread of most successful political practitioners." MARTIN TOLCHIN & SUSAN J.
TOLCHIN, To THE VICTOR 22 (1971), quoted in Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 104
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, and remanding 868 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.
1989).
13. See ABA Blueprint for Professionalism, supra note 2, at 261 ("The practice of law 'in the
spirit of a public service' can and ought to be the hallmark of the legal profession."). Even apart
from its moral dimension, the spoils system is politically corrosive. As Senator Pendleton, one of
the sponsors of the Civil Service Act of 1883, stated, "I believe ... that ... the 'spoils system[ ]'
must be killed or it will kill the Republic." 14 CONG. REC. 206 (1882), quoted in Robert G.
Vaughn, Ethics in Government and the Vision of Public Service, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 420
n.13 (1990).
14. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1242-43
(1991) ("A narrative is a story about people; it is specific in time, place, participants, circum-
stances, action, and outcome, and begins with some version of 'once upon a time.' The action and
fate of the participants reveals a moral.... A narrative can also convey more global definitions of
a person or group.").
15. In re Estate of Freeman, 311 N.E.2d 480, 483 (N.Y. 1974).
16. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953), quoted
in ABA Blueprint for Professionalism, supra note 2, at 261.
17. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1986).
18. ABA Blueprint for Professionalism, supra note 2, at 250.
19. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 32 (1936).
1993]
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This narrative-which defines and distinguishes the legal profession-
provides the legal community with a shared history and a common inter-
pretation of that history. While the shared history and its interpretation
may be discussed and disputed even among lawyers, they provide the indi-
vidual members of the legal profession with the sense that they are more
alike than unlike. More important, the narrative establishes with whom the
legal profession wishes to be ethically bound and by which civic virtues
lawyers wish to be guided. Speaking from within its own narrative, the
legal profession finds itself bound by the ethical criteria embodied in it, and
bound to those who speak the same ethical language.2"
B. Ethics and the Legislature
The public perception of legislators-a disproportionate number of
whom are lawyers2 1-is quite different from the legal profession's self-per-
ception.22 In recent years, polls have found that a majority of the public
believes that at least one of every three members of Congress is corrupt 23
and that lawmakers improperly profit from their office. 24 A New York
Times/CBS News survey found that an overwhelming percentage of the
public believes that legislators are more interested in serving special inter-
est groups than serving the people they represent. 25 A Washington Post!
ABC News poll found that most Americans think that the overall level of
ethics and honesty among legislators has fallen during the past ten years.26
The current public perception is not unfounded. In recent years,
Speaker of the House of Representatives Jim Wright (D-Tex.) resigned after
the House Ethics Committee found reason to believe that he had violated
House rules;27 Majority Whip Tony Coelho (D-Cal.) resigned in the face of
an ethics probe;28 formal complaints against Senators David Durenberger
(R-Minn.) and Alfonse D'Amato (R-N.Y.) were filed with the Senate Eth-
20. See ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS 268 (1966).
21. In Congress, for example, more than 60 Senators and nearly 200 members of the House of
Representatives are lawyers. See generally CONGRESSIONAL YELLOW BOOK (1991).
22. See Ann McBride, Ethics in Congress: Agenda and Action, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451,
453 (1990).
23. Bob Minzesheimer, Poll: Many Say Congress 'Corrupt,' USA TODAY, June 2, 1989, at Al.
24. Richard Morin & Dan Balz, Majority in Poll Criticize Congress, WASH. POST, May 26,
1989, at A8.
25. Robin Toner, The Budget Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1990, at A21.
26. David S. Broder & Thomas B. Edsall, 'Where's the Beef?' 1990, WASH. POST, Sept. 24-30,
1990, at 7 (weekly ed.).
27. Tom Kenworthy, House Committee Charges Wright with 69 Ethics-Rules Violations,
WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1989, at Al.
28. Michael Oreskes, Washington Talk, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1989, at A18.
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ics Committee;29 Senators Alan Cranston (D-Cal.), Dennis DeConcini (D-
Ariz.), John Glenn (D-Ohio), John McCain (R- Ariz.), and Donald Riegle
(R-Mich.) were investigated for allegedly intervening in regulatory proceed-
ings on behalf of Charles Keating, who had made campaign contributions,
corporate donations, and gifts to those Senators in excess of $1 million;30
and Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Or.) was investigated by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and the Senate Ethics Committee for accepting nearly
$15,000 in airline travel and gifts from the University of South Carolina.31
Contemporary social and political theory has not ignored such legisla-
tive scandal. Public choice scholarship, applying principles of market eco-
nomics to explain political behavior, postulates that legislators act primarily
out of self-interest directed to secure selfish ends.32 According to public
choice theorists, the primary purpose of the legislators is re-election,33 and
legislators "sell" their services to those special interest groups willing to pay
the price demanded.34  As a result, legislators serve the interests of the
powerful while ignoring the interests of those unable or unwilling to exert
political influence.35
Public choice theory is a dramatic and, if accurate, unfortunate recon-
ceptualization of the democratic process. As a description, it is an extreme
departure from the vision of legislators who, as ethical, rational, and pur-
poseful agents, reach ethical, rational, and purposeful results.36 As depicted
by public choice theorists, legislators bear a striking resemblance to the de-
29. Charles R. Babcock, Publisher Paid Durenberger After Collecting Speech Fees, WASH.
POST, Dec. 14, 1989, at Al; Howard Kurtz, Rival Seeks Ethics Probe of D'Amato, WASH. POST,
July 18, 1989, at AS.
30. Ethics Panel Begins Probes Involving Six U.S. Senators, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 1989, at
A10.
31. Richard L. Berke, For Hatfield, a Shining Image Tarnished by Ethics Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 1991, at Al.
32. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CON-
SENT 265-82 (1962); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); Daniel
A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REv. 873 (1987).
33. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the
Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 691, 705 (1987).
34. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory In-
terpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 227-33 (1986); Nicholas S. Zep-
pos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward A Fact-Finding Model of
Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1304 (1990).
35. Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 33, at 706.
36. This vision of legislators is embodied in the legal process materials developed by Henry
Hart and Albert Sacks in the 1950s at Harvard Law School. See HENRY HART, JR. & ALBERT
M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
1414-15 (10th ed. 1958) (stating that when interpreting a statute, a court should assume "that the
legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably").
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scription of 1950s Eastern bloc political bureaucrats in Milovan Djilas's
The New Class.37 The "new class," Djilas wrote, "may be said to be made
up of those who have special privileges and economic preference because of
the administrative monopoly they hold."' 38 "Politics as a profession," he
continued, "is the ideal of those who have the desire or the prospect of
living as parasites at the expense of others. '39
Normatively, the image of the "legislator for sale" is unworthy of our
history. It is true that, like public choice theorists, the Framers of the Con-
stitution revealed a distrust of elected officials in general, and of legislators
in particular.4° "[I]t is against the enterprising ambition of [legislators],"
warned James Madison in The Federalist No. 48, "that the people ought to
indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions. ' 41 Quoting
Thomas Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia, Madison wrote, "One
hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as one....
An elective despotism was not the government we fought for."'42
Unlike public choice theorists, however, the Framers believed that gov-
ernmental checks and balances would control legislative abuses.
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of
the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the
place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices
should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what
is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human na-
ture? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on
government would be necessary.43
Unfortunately, government checks and balances have, to date, proved
inadequate to ensure ethical conduct by lawmakers. Ethics legislation is
infrequently part of the legislative agenda" and, when passed, has often
been invalidated or narrowly interpreted by the courts.
For example, as a direct result of the Watergate scandal, Congress
amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971" to establish limits
37. MILOVAN DJILAS, THE NEW CLASS (1957).
38. Id. at 39.
39. Id. at 46.
40. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 9 (1956).
41. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 253 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 2d ed. 1987).
42. Id. at 254.
43. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 265 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Max Beloff
ed., 2d ed. 1987).
44. See McBride, supra note 22, at 455.
45. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
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on the size of individual campaign contributions to federal candidates, of
expenditures by the candidates themselves, and of independent expenditures
to promote a candidate.46 The primary interest served by the amendments
was the prevention of corruption, and the appearance of corruption,
spawned by the influence of large financial contributions on candidates' po-
sitions and on their actions if elected to office.4 This legislation was
viewed, by some, as "the most comprehensive reform legislation [ever]
passed by Congress concerning the election of the President, Vice-Presi-
dent, and members of Congress."48
The constitutionality of the 1974 Amendments was immediately tested,
and the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo4 9 invalidated the limitations on
independent and candidate expenditures." The Court recognized that cam-
paign contributions given to secure a political quid pro quo undermine the
integrity of representative democracy. The Court also recognized the cor-
rosive effects that the appearance of improper influence and corruption en-
gendered by large campaign contributions have on the public. 1 The Court
opined, however, that the state interest in preventing the appearance and
reality of political corruption caused by large independent and candidate
expenditures was outweighed by the effects that expenditure limitations
would have on First Amendment rights. 2
In a strong dissent from the Court's decision striking down expenditure
limitations, Justice White warned that the act of expending money on be-
half of a candidate "may be used to secure the express or tacit understand-
ing that the giver will enjoy political favor if the candidate is elected."53
Congress and the courts, he observed, have recognized this as a "mortal
danger" against which preventive and curative steps should be taken. 4 It is
critical, he concluded, to dispel the impression that elections are merely a
function of money and that political races are "reserved for those who have
46. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
47. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
48. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 424 U.S.
1 (1976).
49. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
50. For an excellent treatment of Buckley and its progeny, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1132-53 (2d ed. 1988).
51. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
52. Id. at 48-49.
53. Id. at 259 (White, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
1993]
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the facility and the stomach for doing whatever it takes" to prevail at the
polls."
More recently, in McCormick v. United States,16 the Supreme Court
overturned the conviction of Robert McCormick, a former West Virginia
legislator who was fined $50,000 and given a three-year suspended sentence
for extortion.5 7 McCormick was convicted of demanding money from a
group of medical doctors in exchange for his support for certain legislation
in the West Virginia House of Delegates. In reversing McCormick's con-
viction, the Court held that the receipt of money by an elected official is
extortion "only if the payments are made in return for an explicit promise
or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act."'5 1
Supporting legislation that will benefit the interests of certain individuals,
shortly before or after campaign contributions are solicited and received
from those individuals, is not illegal, wrote the Court, "[w]hatever ethical
considerations and appearances may indicate. '59
In a dissent joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, Justice Stevens
wrote that "there is no statutory requirement that illegal agreements,
threats, or promises be in writing, or in any particular form."6 "Subtle
extortion," Stevens continued, "is just as wrongful-and probably much
more common-than the kind of express understanding that the Court's
opinion seems to require."61
While it is unfair to conclude, based upon these few facts, that Buckley
and McCormick were decided incorrectly, it is fair to conclude that the
legislative practices upheld by the Court do not reflect the civic virtues em-
bodied in the legal profession's narrative about what lawyers are and what
lawyers should be. It is also fair to conclude that these legislative prac-
tices-the same that are disparaged by the public and analyzed by public
choice scholars-are, in the end, unacceptable, if not as a political institu-
tion, then at least as an ethical tradition.
55. Id. at 265. Judge Harold Leventhal, a member of the en banc panel from the District of
Columbia Circuit whose decision to uphold the expenditure limitations was reversed by the
Supreme Court, later wrote that the Buckley decision "may have knocked out a central feature of
a program dependent on a number of interrelated provisions," and said the decision may "devital-
ize and destabilize this reform legislation." Harold Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 345, 375-76 (1977).
56. 111 S. Ct. 1807 (1991), rev'g and remanding 896 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1990).
57. Stephen Wermiel, High Court Rules on Extortion Cases Against Officials, WALL ST. J.,
May 24, 1991, at B8.
58. McCormick, ill S. Ct. at 1816 (emphasis added).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1821 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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C. A Legislative Code of Ethics
Philosophical ethicists are, on the whole, divided into two great camps.
There are those, like Jeremy Bentham62 and John Stuart Mill,6 3 who con-
sider that the goodness or badness of an action is measured by its conse-
quences. Others, like Aristotle 4 and Immanuel Kant,65 consider that an
action must be measured not against its consequences, but against particu-
lar ethical standards.66
In purely utilitarian terms, a code of ethics for the attorney-legislator is
needed for two reasons. First, ethical conduct by lawmakers is a precondi-
tion to making good public policy. "Ethics rules, if reasonably drafted and
reliably enforced, increase the likelihood that legislators (and other officials)
will make decisions and policies based on the merits of issues, rather than
on factors (such as personal gain) that should be irrelevant."67 Second,
public confidence in the integrity of the government is fundamental to our
system of representative democracy.68 If the legislature is to command the
respect, trust, and confidence of the people, the individuals who serve in the
legislature must be perceived as adhering to high standards of ethical
conduct.69
A model code of ethics for the attorney-legislator is also needed to en-
able the attorney-legislator to measure his or her conduct against specific
62. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEG-
ISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789).
63. See JOHN S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Oskar Piest ed., The Library of Liberal Arts 1957)
(1861).
64. See ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935 (Richard
McKeon ed., 1941).
65. See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis W.
Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1959) (1785).
66. Julius Cohen, The Political Function of Ethical Theory: Implications for Philosophical Ju-
risprudence, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 575, 580 (1991) ("The split is broadly between those, like the
Kantians, who regard morality as belonging to an autonomous realm of its own, i.e., disconnected
from the world that is revealed by science, and those, like the utilitarians, who connect ethics with
the scientific conception of the world.").
67. Congressional Ethics Rules: Hearings Before the House Bipartisan Task Force on Ethics,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989) (statement of Dennis F. Thompson, Professor of Political Philoso-
phy, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University).
68. "[T]he basis of effective government is public confidence, and that confidence is endan-
gered when ethical standards falter or appear to falter." Special Message to Congress on Conflict-
of-Interest Legislation and on Problems of Ethics in Government, PUB. PAPERS 326 (Apr. 27,
1961), quoted in Beth Nolan, Regulating Government Ethics: When It's Not Enough to Just Say
No, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 405, 405 n.2 (1990).
69. McBride, supra note 22, at 451; see also United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating
Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961) ("[D]emocracy is effective only if the people have faith in those who
govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in
activities which arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption.").
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ethical standards. Ethical conduct, in this sense, entails living up to stan-
dards derived from the legal profession's narrative and codes of professional
responsibility. Because the legal profession's narrative and codes of profes-
sional responsibility define the profession's virtue, the ethical attorney-leg-
islator will, accordingly, pursue his or her profession as "a common calling
in the spirit of public service,"70 will find his or her highest honor in a
"deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty,"71 and
will conduct himself or herself as a member of "a learned, disciplined, and
honorable occupation."72
More particularly, the ethical attorney-legislator will observe high stan-
dards of conduct and act in a manner that promotes confidence in the integ-
rity of the legislature.73 The ethical attorney-legislator will not allow family
or social relationships to influence official judgment.74 The ethical attorney-
legislator will not lend the prestige of legislative office to advance private
interests over the public interest.7" The ethical attorney-legislator will not
use campaign contributions for the private benefit of the legislator.7 6 The
ethical attorney-legislator will not accept private employment on matters in
which the legislator personally and substantially participated as a legisla-
tor.77 The ethical attorney-legislator will not hold membership in any or-
ganization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
religion, or national origin.78 The ethical attorney-legislator will disqualify
himself or herself from voting on legislation in which the legislator has a
direct financial interest and will refrain from financial and business dealings
that exploit the legislator's official position.79 And the ethical attorney-leg-
70. POUND, supra note 16, at 5.
71. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 32 (1936).
72. In re Estate of Freeman, 311 N.E.2d 480, 483 (N.Y. 1974).
73. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9, supra note 3; CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2, supra note 5; CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 2, supra note 5; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDERS Canon 2, supra
note 7; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES CLERKS (AND DEPUTY CLERKS) Canon 2,
supra note 8; and CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS Canon 2, supra note 9.
74. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, supra note 5.
75. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-4 (1986).
76. See, e.g., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B & Commentary, supra note 5.
77. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101 (1986).
78. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, Canon 2A cmt., supra note
5.
79. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 5, supra note 5; CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 supra note 5; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFEND-
ERS Canon 5, supra note 7; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES CLERKS (AND DEPUTY
CLERKS) Canon 5, supra note 8; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS Canon 5, supra note 9.
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islator will not solicit or accept a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from anyone
who has sought or is seeking to influence the legislature.8 0
The ethical attorney-legislator will live up to these standards as part of a
tradition that defines the legal community. Communities are known and
judged by the kind of people they develop. If the legal profession-the
community of lawyers-is to be known as an ethical community, it must
continue to develop ethical lawyers, and, among them, ethical legislators.
III. A MODEL CODE OF ETHICS FOR THE ATTORNEY-LEGISLATOR
CANON 1
A LEGISLATOR SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
OF THE LEGISLATURE"'
An honorable legislature is indispensable to the common good of our
society. A legislator should observe, and should impart to staff, high stan-
dards of conduct so that the integrity of the legislature may be preserved
and the office may reflect a devotion to serving the public.8 2 The provisions
of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective.
80. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-34 (1986) ("The impartiality
of a public servant in our legal system may be impaired by the receipt of gifts or loans.").
81. This Canon is modeled after MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 1,
supra note 3; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 1, supra note 5; CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon I, supra note 5; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDERS Canon 1, supra note 7; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES CLERKS (AND
DEPUTY CLERKS) Canon 1, supra note 8; and CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS Canon 1,
supra note 9.
82. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-1 (1986) ("Maintaining the
integrity and improving the competence of the bar to meet the highest standards is the ethical
responsibility of every lawyer."); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC
9-6 (1986). That Ethical Consideration states:
Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor of his profession; to
encourage respect for the law and for the courts and the judges thereof; to observe the
Code of Professional Responsibility; to act as a member of a learned profession, one dedi-
cated to public service; to cooperate with his brother lawyers in supporting the organized
bar through the devoting of his time, efforts, and financial support as his professional
standing and ability reasonably permit; to conduct himself so as to reflect credit on the
legal profession and to inspire the confidence, respect, and trust of his clients and of the
public; and to strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also the appearance of
impropriety.
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CANON 2
A LEGISLATOR SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES8 3
A. A legislator should respect and comply with the law 4 and should
act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity
of the legislature. A legislator should not engage in any activities that
would put into question the propriety of the legislator's conduct in carrying
out the duties of the office.
B. A legislator should not allow family, social, or other relationships
to influence official conduct or judgment." A legislator should not lend the
prestige of legislative office to advance the private interests 6 of others, nor
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the legislator.8 7
C. A candidate for election to legislative office:8 8
(1) should maintain the dignity appropriate to legislative office and
should encourage family members to adhere to the same standards
of conduct that apply to the candidate;
83. This Canon is modeled after MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9,
supra note 3; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2, supra note 5; CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, supra note 5; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDERS Canon 2, supra note 7; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES CLERKS (AND
DEPUTY CLERKS) Canon 2, supra note 8; and CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS Canon 2,
supra note 9.
84. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(3) & (4) (1986) ("A
lawyer shall not ... [e]ngage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude [or e]ngage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.").
85. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-101(A) (1986).
DR 8-101 Action as a Public Official
(A) A lawyer who holds public office shall not:
(1) Use his public position to obtain, or attempt to obtain, a special advantage in legisla-
tive matters for himself or for a client under circumstances where he knows or it is obvious
that such action is not in the public interest.
(2) Use his public position to influence, or attempt to influence, a tribunal to act in favor
of himself or of a client.
(3) Accept any thing of value from any person when the lawyer knows or it is obvious
that the offer is for the purpose of influencing his action as a public official.
86. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-4 (1986). That Ethical Con-
sideration states: "[W]hen a lawyer purports to act on behalf of the public, he should espouse
only [that] . . . which he conscientiously believes to be in the public interest." Id. (emphasis
added).
87. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101(C) (1986) ("A lawyer
shall not state or imply that he is able to influence improperly or upon irrelevant grounds any
tribunal, legislative body, or public official.").
88. See, e.g., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B.
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(2) should prohibit staff, employees, consultants and volunteers
subject to the direction or control of the candidate from doing that
which the candidate is prohibited from doing under this Canon;
(3) should not misrepresent the candidate's identity, qualifications,
present position, or any other fact;8 9
(4) should not use legislative offices, resources, or staff to engage in
campaign activities.
D. A candidate should not use or permit the use of campaign contri-
butions for the private benefit of the candidate or members of the candi-
date's family.90
E. A legislator should not accept private employment, or act as a rep-
resentative, on matters in which the legislator personally and substantially
participated as a legislator.91
F. A legislator should not, within a reasonable time of leaving office,
but in no case less than one year, make, with the intent to influence, any
communication to or appearance before, current members of the legislative
body in which he or she served, or their staff, in connection with any mat-
ter on which such former legislator seeks action by a current legislator or
staff in his or her official capacity, except if such former legislator is appear-
ing on behalf of a governmental entity.
G. A legislator should not hold membership in any organization that
practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or na-
tional origin. 92
89. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A) (1986) ("A lawyer
shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his
firm, use or participate in the use of any form of public communication containing a false, fraudu-
lent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim.").
90. See, eg., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B and Commentary, supra note 5.
91. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101 (1986).
DR 9-101 Avoiding Even the Appearance of Impropriety
(A) A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter upon the merits of which
he has acted in a judicial capacity.
(B) A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substan-
tial responsibility while he was a public employee.
(C) A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence improperly or upon
irrelevant grounds any tribunal, legislative body, or public official.
92. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2A cmt., supra note 5.
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CANON 3
A LEGISLATOR SHOULD PERFORM THE DUTIES OF THE
OFFICE DILIGENTLY AND IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST93
The legislative duties of a legislator take precedence over all other activ-
ities. Legislative duties include all duties of the office prescribed by law. In
the performance of these duties, the following standards apply:
A. Legislative Responsibilities
(1) A legislator should be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence in it. A legislator should advance the public interest over pri-
vate interests. 94
(2) A legislator should maintain decorum in all legislative
proceedings.
(3) A legislator should be patient, dignified, and courteous to constitu-
ents and others with whom the legislator deals in the legislator's official
capacity, and should require similar conduct of staff members and others
subject to the legislator's direction and control."
B. Administrative Responsibilities
(1) A legislator should diligently discharge the legislator's administra-
tive responsibilities, maintain professional competence in legislative admin-
istration, and facilitate the performance of the administrative
responsibilities of other legislators and staff members.
93. This Canon is modeled after MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6
and 8, supra note 3; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3, supra note 5;
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3, supra note 5; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDERS Canon 3, supra note 7; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES CLERKS (AND
DEPUTY CLERKS) Canon 3, supra note 8; and CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS Canon 3,
supra note 9.
94. The term "public interest" is taken from MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY EC 8-4 (1986). That Ethical Consideration states:
Whenever a lawyer seeks legislative or administrative changes, he should identify the ca-
pacity in which he appears, whether on behalf of himself, a client, or the public. A lawyer
may advocate such changes on behalf of a client even though he does not agree with them.
But when a lawyer purports to act on behalf of the public, he should espouse only those
changes which he conscientiously believes to be in the public interest.
Id.
95. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1986) ("A lawyer...
should be temperate and dignified, and he should refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensible
conduct.").
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(2) A legislator should require staff subject to the legislator's direction
and control to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to
the legislator.
(3) A legislator should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary meas-
ures against a legislator or staff member for unprofessional conduct of
which the legislator may become aware.
96
(4) A legislator should exercise the power of appointment only on the
basis of merit, avoiding nepotism, unfairness, and favoritism, but may take
into account domicile or political affiliation to the extent allowed by law.
(5) A legislator should avoid any favoritism, unfairness, or nepotism
in connection with the hiring, discharge, or treatment of subordinates, but
may take into account domicile or political affiliation to the extent allowed
by law.
C. Disqualification97
(1) A legislator should disqualify himself or herself from voting on
legislation in which the legislator has a direct financial interest, including
but not limited to instances where:
(a) The legislator knows that, individually or as a fiduciary, the
legislator or the legislator's spouse or minor child residing in the
legislator's household has a direct financial interest in the subject
matter of the legislation.
(b) The legislator or the legislator's spouse, or a person within the
third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a
person is known by the legislator to have a direct financial interest in
the subject matter of the legislation.
(2) A legislator should keep informed about the legislator's personal
and fiduciary financial interests and should make a reasonable effort to keep
informed about the personal financial interests of the legislator's spouse and
minor children residing in the legislator's household.
(3) For the purposes of this section:
(a) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil
law system;
(b) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administra-
tor, trustee, and guardian;
96. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-4 (1986) ("The integrity of
the profession can be maintained only if conduct of lawyers in violation of the Disciplinary Rules
is brought to the attention of the proper officials.").
97. This section is modeled after CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon
3C, supra note 5; and CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C, supra note 5.
1993]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
(c) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equitable in-
terest, however small, or a relationship as director, advisor, or other
active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:
i. ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds
securities is not a "financial interest" in such securities unless the
legislator participates in the management of the fund;
ii. an office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or
civic organization is not a "financial interest" in securities held by
the organization;
iii. the proprietary interest of a policy holder in a mutual insurance
company, of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar
proprietary interest, is a "financial interest" in the organization only
if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value
of the interest;
iv. ownership of governmental securities is a "financial interest" in
the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially
affect the value of the securities.
CANON 4
A LEGISLATOR MAY ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES TO
IMPROVE THE LAW AND SOCIETY9
8
A legislator, subject to the proper performance of legislative duties, may
engage in the following law-related activities:
A. A legislator may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in
other activities concerning the law and society.
B. A legislator may serve as a member, officer, or director of any
organization or governmental agency devoted to the improvement of
the law or society. A legislator may assist such an organization in
raising funds and may participate in its management and invest-
ment, but should not personally participate in public fund-raising
activities. A legislator may make recommendations to public and
private fund-granting agencies on projects and programs concerning
the law and society.
C. A legislator should not use to any substantial degree legislative
resources or staff to engage in activities permitted by this Canon that
are unrelated to the legislator's official duties.
98. This Canon is modeled after CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 4,
supra note 5; CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, supra note 5; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDERS Canon 4, supra note 7; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES
CLERKS (AND DEPUTY CLERKS) Canon 4, supra note 8; and CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW
CLERKS Canon 4, supra note 9.
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CANON 5
A LEGISLATOR SHOULD REGULATE EXTRA-
OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES TO MINIMIZE THE
RISK OF CONFLICT WITH OFFICIAL
DUTIES99
A. Avocational Activities.
A legislator may write, lecture, teach, and speak on nonlegal subjects,
and engage in the arts, sports, and other social and recreational activities, if
such avocational activities do not detract from the dignity of the office, in-
terfere with the performance of the legislator's official duties, or adversely
reflect on the operation and the dignity of the legislature.
B. Civic and Charitable Activities.
A legislator may participate in civic and charitable activities that do not
detract from the dignity of the office or interfere with the performance of
official duties. A legislator may serve as an officer, director, trustee, or advi-
sor of an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization
and solicit funds for any such organization, subject to the following
limitations:
(1) A legislator should not use or permit the use of the prestige of
the office in the solicitation of funds.
(2) A legislator should not solicit subordinates to contribute to or
participate in any civic or charitable activity.
C. Financial Activities
(1) A legislator should refrain from financial and business dealings
that tend to interfere with the proper performance of official duties, exploit
the official position, or otherwise give the appearance of impropriety.
(2) Neither a legislator nor a member of the legislator's family residing
in the legislator's household should solicit or accept a gift, bequest, favor, or
loan from anyone who has sought or is seeking to influence the legislature
or other entity served by the legislator, or such a gift, bequest, favor, or loan
that would influence or give the appearance of influencing the legislator in
99. This Canon is modeled after CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 5,
supra note 5; CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5, supra note 5; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDERS Canon 5, supra note 7; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES
CLERKS (AND DEPUTY CLERKS) Canon 5, supra note 8; and CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW
CLERKS Canon 5, supra note 9.
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the performance of official duties, or otherwise give the appearance of
impropriety. 'O
(3) Neither a legislator nor a member of the legislator's family residing
in the legislator's household should solicit or accept a gift, bequest, favor, or
loan from anyone else except for:
(a) a gift incident to a public testimonial, books, tapes, and other
resource materials supplied by publishers on a complimentary basis
for official use; or an invitation to the legislator and a family member
to attend a bar-related function or an activity devoted to the im-
provement of the law or society;
(b) a gift, award, or benefit incident to the business, profession, or
other separate activity of a spouse or other family member of a legis-
lator residing in the legislator's household, including gifts, awards,
and benefits for the use of both the spouse (or other family member)
and the legislator (as spouse or family member), provided the gift,
award, or benefit could not reasonably be perceived as intended to
influence the legislator in the performance of official duties;
(c) ordinary social hospitality;
(d) a gift from a relative or friend for a special occasion, such as a
wedding, anniversary, or birthday, if the gift is fairly commensurate
with the occasion and the relationship;
(e) a loan from a lending institution in its regular course of busi-
ness on the same terms generally available to persons who are not
legislators; or
(f) a scholarship or fellowship awarded on the same terms and
based on the same criteria applied to other applicants.
(4) For purposes of this section, "members of the legislator's family
residing in the legislator's household" means any relative of a legislator by
blood or marriage, or a person treated by a legislator as a member of the
legislator's family, who resides in the legislator's household.
(5) A legislator should report the value of any gift, bequest, favor, or
loan as required by law.
(6) A legislator is not required by this Code to disclose his or her in-
come, debts, or investments, except as provided in this Canon and Canon 6.
(7) Information acquired by a legislator in the legislator's official ca-
pacity should not be used or disclosed by the legislator in financial dealings
or for any other purpose not related to the legislator's official duties.
100. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-34 (1986) ("The impartial-
ity of a public servant in our legal system may be impaired by the receipt of gifts or loans.").
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D. Extra-official Appointments.
A legislator should not accept extra-official appointments if the legisla-
tor's duties would interfere with the performance of official duties or tend to
undermine the public confidence in the integrity of the legislature.
E. Offices, Resources, and Staff.
A legislator should not use legislative offices, resources, or staff to en-
gage in activities permitted by this Canon, except for uses that are de
minimis.
CANON 6
A LEGISLATOR SHOULD REGULARLY FILE REPORTS
OF COMPENSATION RECEIVED FOR ALL
EXTRA-OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES101
A legislator may receive compensation and reimbursement of expenses
for all extra-official activities permitted by the Code if the source of such
payments has not sought and is not seeking to influence the legislature or
other entity served by the legislator, does not influence or give the appear-
ance of influencing the legislator in the performance of official duties, or
otherwise give the appearance of impropriety, subject to the following
restrictions:
A. Compensation. Compensation should not exceed a reasonable
amount nor should it exceed that normally received by others for the
same activity.
B. Expense Reimbursement. Expense reimbursement should be
limited to the actual costs of travel, food, and lodging reasonably
incurred by the legislator and, where appropriate to the occasion, by
the legislator's spouse. Any payment in excess of such an amount is
compensation.
C. Public Reports. A legislator should report the date, place, and
nature of any activity for which the legislator received compensa-
tion, and the name of the payor and the amount of compensation so
received. The legislator's report should be made at least annually
and should be filed as a public document in the office of the clerk of
the legislature.
101. This Canon is modeled after CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon
6, supra note 5; CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6, supra note 5; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDERS Canon 6, supra note 7; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES
CLERKS (AND DEPUTY CLERKS) Canon 6, supra note 8; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS
Canon 6, supra note 9.
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